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Europe as Will and Imagination 
 
In the face of the processes of unification of Europe and the confrontation with the 
influence non-European cultures, there appear from time to time questions about European 
identity.  Although a majority of people intuitively apprehend the cultural specificity of 
our continent, they have, as a rule, some difficulty with precisely defining this identity.  
The following text sets for itself a quite humble task.  Namely, it proposes to work 
towards such a definition, referring to issues which are generally known to specialists, but 
of which the larger public is not always cognizant.  Because it has a popularizing 
character, it does not include references to the voluminous literature on the subject. 
 
                                                                         * 
In asking about European identity, we are asking above all about the dominant and 
specific features of European culture.  By the latter, in turn, we commonly mean the set of 
most widely accepted outlook-shaping and axiological (value-forming) convictions, which 
find their expression in religion, the law, morality, art, science, and politics.  The basic 
problem is that these convictions have undergone historical and geographical 
differentiation.  This means, among other things, that questions about European identity at 
once lead to questions about what we mean by “Europe,” and from what time we date its 
origins. When we speak of Europe do we include classical antiquity?  Do we include the 
Middle Ages?  Or are we speaking of the modern or indeed only of the contemporary era?  
Shall we acknowledge, for example, Andalusia under the rule of the Moors as part of 
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Europe, or not?  Shall we abstract from the many geographically determined versions of 
European culture and try to delineate some trans-regional features, or should we rather try 
to emphasize the relative distinctiveness of those versions?  The issue is thus quite 
complicated, and every attempt to same something about Europe “in general” will of 
necessity lead to considerable simplification.  If, however, we are to do this we must 
remember that Europe, taken as a cultural unity, is always the result of a certain 
construction, of the use of ideal types, to use Max Weber’s famous term; that is to say of 
schematized models which, for research purposes, have been abstracted from a plethora of 
empirical facts and which concentrate only on those features which in the view of the 
researcher are the most significant.  Every model which goes by the name of “Europe” or 
“European culture” is, therefore, the result of a certain outlook, a certain design, the result 
of an emphasis on one thing at the expense of another, and will as a rule express a moral 
and also a political choice.  In this sense I do not believe that there can exist a kind of 
“Europe in itself,” but rather that we have a vision of the Europe that we would like there 
to be. We need, then, strength both of will and of imagination, in order to specify her 
identity, and hence the title of this article, an obvious parody of the title of Arthur 
Schopenhauer’s most famous work (The World as Will and Representation). 
 
Keeping in mind the full complexity of the problem of “Europe” and the complexity of 
Europe itself, of the struggle within it of competing tendencies, we may feel inclined to 
sketch out certain things that we deem typical of European culture.  As a basic criterion of 
this kind of undertaking let us stipulate that we may speak of Europe (or more broadly of 
“the West”) in principle when its inhabitants assume that it exists.  Thereby we are taking 
as the fundamental criterion for the question whether Europe exists, and on what its 
3 
 
distinctiveness depends, the consciousness of its inhabitants.  And on this basis we may 
confess that Europe is a rather unsteady concept.  At all times her conceptualization has 
been largely the concern of the political and intellectual elite, while representatives of the 
common people at least up to the 19th century considered themselves above all to be 
“locals,” generally having not only no idea of such a place as “Europe,” but little sense of 
any existence beyond the confines of their own village or town.  There is no space here to 
go into the gripping process of the historical evolution of a consciousness of the existence 
of Europe; it will suffice to say that the ancient Greeks already divided the world into 
those who spoke Greek and the barbarians (that is, those who spoke gibberish).  The same 
tack was taken by the Romans, who considered to be barbarians all those who were not 
subjects of the Empire or who did not accept its laws and customs.  Typical of the Middle 
Ages would be the division between Christian and pagan, while in the modern era the 
basic dichotomy would become between West and East (the so-called Orient).  
Consciousness of the distinctiveness and specificity of what we currently think of as 
Europe has always intensified in the face of conflict with others.  One might say that a 
notion of Europe-in-itself became one of Europe-for-itself, to use this philosophical 
expression.  And here I would say that the present interest in the question of Europe and 
its identity results from, among other things, the conviction that we have once again to do 
with confrontation, struggle and conflict with those who constitute a threat to Europe or 
who may seem to be threatening to it. 
 
So what does the identity of Europe depend upon?  What could be said to characterize it?  
First of all, we may cite a propensity for self-criticism and self-reflection, an ability to 
subject to doubt one’s own convictions.  In this regard one might point out that the quite 
4 
 
specific, dynamic, mutable and internally differentiated tradition of philosophy has always 
been a kind of laboratory of European thought.  No other culture possesses such a 
philosophical tradition, although this does not mean, of course, that Europe has had a 
monopoly on philosophical thought.  It means only that the philosophy of the West has 
been from the very outset a field of conflict, disagreement, and debate, the birthplace of 
new cognitive and axiological models, new ways of seeing the world.  It was this tradition 
that gave European thought a dynamism not found elsewhere, which became one of the 
tools in the process of European self-education.  The work of this philosophical tradition 
was carried on by science, which has by degrees absorbed it.  Religion, and specifically 
Christianity, has also had an effect on the dynamism of Western culture.  Christianity has 
always been internally varied, and this variety led to reflection on religion and hence to 
theology, as a reflection on the nature of God, which developed over time.   Religious 
practice, too, in Europe has always been of its own kind, if we consider the core meaning 
of the Reformation in internally transforming this practice from a “religion of fate” to a 
“religion of choice,” this latter not occurring anywhere outside of European culture.  And 
here it is worth mentioning the specifically European process of the so-called second 
disenchantment of the world, which was so well described by Max Weber.  In rough terms 
this means the separation from religious principles of social sub-practices such as science, 
the law, economics, and art, and their re-orientation towards their own regulatory values 
(for example, economics – efficiency and profit; science – truth; the law – normative 
fairness; art – originality and authenticity). 
 
This already-mentioned dynamism was transferred from philosophical and religious 
thought into other spheres, including art and politics.  Nowhere has art been so stylistically 
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diverse, nor has politics had such rich philosophical and intellectual resources, as in 
Europe, or more broadly speaking in the West.  (Let us recall that the West is a more 
capacious concept than Europe, in which are included regional cultures, such as American 
culture, that although deeply rooted in a European heritage nonetheless possess their own 
distinctiveness.)  Besides the development of philosophy and theology, another fruitful 
event for Europe, this time of an institutional nature, was the advent of universities (the 
first European universities were founded in Bologna and Paris during the 12th century).  
They became places in which, thanks to the opportunity for debate and criticism, new 
ideas had a chance to arise, imparting to European culture a character of mutability and 
diversity.  The intellectual innovation of Europe that I have referred to led to the 
development of a specific European attitude which treated novelty as a value in itself.  
This phenomenon appeared in the modern era, and in particular during the period of 
Romanticism.  It was then that we can detect the beginning of what historians of culture 
have called “the tradition [of seeking] that which is new.”  Romanticism also reinforced 
European individualism by propagating the cult of the creative genius and a mythology of 
the unique internal experience of each person, even though – paradoxically – it was also 
often to advocate expressis verbis communal values, which were, moreover, often based 
on tribal models.  Let us add to all the foregoing the birth and development of industry and 
technology, closely connected with the development of modern science in Europe, and not 
occurring on such a scale anywhere else in the world.  (I say “on such a scale,” having in 
mind above all the dynamism of this growth and its effect on everyday life.  Let us note 
that Chinese culture, for example, boasts numerous discoveries and inventions which 
clearly preceded similar discoveries and inventions in Europe; however in China, these 
novelties never became basic dynamizing elements of the structure of everyday life.)   
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Interest in matters that were different and foreign – in a word, non-European – resulting 
from an ability to manufacture otherness in itself, and finally, there was the historical rise 
of the strangest of all economic systems – capitalism (its birth is spoken of as a “European 
miracle”) – and an equally strange political system, democratic liberalism.  Add these 
elements together, and we receive a picture of a civilization which, as a network of 
mutually connected convictions and practices, is the most exotic of all. 
 
What further determined this Sonderweg of Europe?  In order to answer this we must 
reach back to the roots of European culture.  There exists a broad consensus that these 
roots are connected with Greek philosophy (and further – with philosophy as such), 
Roman law, and Christianity.  To this I would add the tradition of the Enlightenment, 
which unquestionably had an influence on European identity during the modern era.  We 
have Greek philosophy to thank for, among other things, the idea of philosophical truth, 
the conception of theory, the technique of argumentation and scientific debate, the laws of 
classical logic, and a whole series of ideas on the subjects of cognition and ontology (for 
example, the differentiation between belief and real  knowledge, the Heraclitian dialectic, 
the atomism of Democritus, and Platonic idealism), and also axiological and political 
ideas (for example, the Socratic idea of care for the soul, the Platonic conception of the 
ideal state, and the Aristotelian conception of man as a political animal).  To later 
philosophy we are indebted for many other intellectual discoveries, among which for lack 
of space we might mention here only a few from the axiological and political spheres: the 
individual, reason of state, the separation of powers, the social contract, tolerance, the 
categorical imperative, sovereignty, autonomy, impartial justice, freedom of speech, etc.  
Here we must also once more mention the Enlightenment tradition, which we have to 
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thank for, among other things, liberal democracy, the valorization of science and 
education, individualism, anti-paternalism, the separation of church and state, the 
conception of a “perpetual peace” between nations, the idea of progress, the beginnings of 
the recognition of rights of women and children, and indeed, human rights.  The second 
pillar of European culture was Roman law, which introduced a whole range of principles 
which came to define the European legal tradition.  I am thinking now of, for example, 
ensuring that trials should proceed by due process of law (involving, among other things, 
the requirement that both sides of a case be heard, and a prohibition on double jeopardy), 
the principle that every accused person should have the right to a fair trial, the idea of 
natural law and the separation between natural and institutional law, the beginnings of the 
idea of a government of laws and of legal defense of private property, the description of 
contract law, the beginning of a distinction between civil and criminal law, and even 
international law.  The third pillar of European culture (in the order of their historical 
appearance) is unquestionably Christianity, to which we owe, among other things, the idea 
of a general brotherhood of man, the moral principle that one should love one’s neighbor 
as oneself (in general: the commandment of love and mercy), a conviction of fundamental 
human equality, the ethic of mutual assistance and of devoting oneself to the good of 
others, the idea of the existence of a kind of justice which transcends earthly justice, the 
separation of the order of God from the order of man (“Render unto Caesar the things 
which are Caesar’s; and unto God the things that are God’s”), a basis for a common 
temporal chronology (which had earlier been done by Jewish thinkers), and finally, faith 
in the fundamental purposefulness of history.  To complete this picture we ought to 
include the contribution of Judaism to the formation of European culture.  It is this 
tradition that we have to thank for the ethic of the Ten Commandments, faith in the 
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formation of wisdom through learning, and the intellectual tradition of the interpretation 
of texts (initially, of course, mostly holy texts).  I have already mentioned the role of the 
Enlightenment in the development of the modern European identity, so here I should like 
only to add that in my opinion the Enlightenment and its ideas would not have been 
possible without Christianity, and that therefore the tension that exists between these two 
traditions I consider to be something on the order of a “family quarrel,” though I know 
that this matter remains controversial.  However there can be no doubt that in general 
terms European culture has always flourished upon its internal diversity and upon the 
tensions that have existed between those diverse elements, and the conflict between 
Christianity and the Enlightenment tradition I deem to have been fruitful for the culture as 
a whole.  This tension can in any event be treated as an example of a much older 
phenomenon, dating back to the time of Constantine the Great, namely the tension 
between the claims of the lay powers and those of the religious authorities.  As Lord 
Acton noted many years ago, this conflict favored the gradual widening of the sphere of 
individual liberty and the liberation of the political dimension of social life from the 
dimension regulated by religious authority. 
 
Many aspects of European culture, as I remarked earlier, are unique, very clearly 
demarcating Europe (the West) off from the rest of the world.  Something which in this 
context particularly bears mention is that to non-European cultures the following ideas 
remain to a certain degree foreign:  the separation of the temporal (lay) order from the 
supernatural (holy) order, the significance of the individual and its priority over the 
collectivity, the recognition of the state as representing the common good and as more 
important that the good of the clan or tribe, the concept of legal government, in which the 
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rule of law governs rather than the whim of the ruler, the formal equality of men and 
women, the concept of human rights, and – last but not least – the idea of liberal 
democracy.  (We must recall that the theory and the practice of democracy we owe to 
classical Greece, although it is obvious that that was not a liberal democracy.)  
 
In conclusion two further remarks can be made.  Firstly, we must remember that European 
culture is indebted in many ways to other cultures, from which it has learned much: the 
list of these other cultures would be long indeed, and here I shall mention only ancient 
Babylon and Egypt, the great Arab culture of the Middle Ages, and finally Europe’s 19th- 
and 20th-century fascination with the Orient.  Secondly, it is quite necessary to point out 
Europe’s (and the West’s) exceptionally rich legacy of evil inventions.  It is here that 
mention must be made of the (pseudo)philosophically and (pseudo)scientifically justified 
ideas of racism, colonialism, xenophobia, and various forms of totalitarianism.  Certainly 
this list of “sins” could be greatly extended.  But this could be considered beside the point.  
What is important is that we must not fall into self-congratulation.  Remembering that in 
European culture which is good, we must not forget what is bad.  Only then will our 
defense of European values be convincing also for non-Europeans. 
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